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  21. INTRODUCTION  
The Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP) is a non-statutory 
advisory non-Departmental Public Body. The Committee comprises a 
Chairman and 14 members. The membership is tripartite, with scientific 
experts, employer and employee representatives.  
The work of the ACDP cuts across a number of Government Departments, 
and thus the Committee is supported by a Secretariat with representatives 
from the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), the Health Protection Agency 
(HPA) on behalf of the Department of Health (DH) and the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra).  
In 2009 the ACDP held three main meetings (the 91
st on the 10
th 
February, the 
92nd
 
on the 8-9
th 
June and the 93
rd on the 10
th 
October). Agenda, papers and 
a summary of these meetings are available at:  
http://www.hse.gov.uk/aboutus/meetings/acdp/index.htm
 
A number of the ACDP Working Groups met throughout the year including:  
•  The Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Working Group 
(TSE WG);  
•  The Drafting Group for revision of the ACDP guidance on blood-
borne viruses;  
•  The Containment Working Group  
 
A summary of these Working Groups can be found under Item 6 of this report.  
 
2. TERMS OF REFERENCE  
The Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens’ terms of reference are:  
“To advise the Health and Safety Executive, and Ministers for the 
Department of Health and the Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs, and their counterparts under devolution in Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland, as required, on all aspects of hazards and 
risks to workers and others from exposure to pathogens.”  
3. DANGEROUS PATHOGENS  
3.1 Background  
 
The remit of ACDP is to provide advice to workers and others on risks from 
exposure to dangerous pathogens (also known as biological agents and 
infectious agents). Workers and others can be exposed to a range of 
dangerous pathogens in the workplace and through workplace activities.  
  3Certain bacteria, fungi, viruses, internal parasites and infectious proteins 
(known as prions) are all defined as dangerous pathogens. Dangerous 
pathogens may be used intentionally at work, for example in a microbiology 
laboratory, but exposure can also occur that is incidental to the purpose of the 
work, for example when healthcare workers are exposed to infectious 
patients, or farmers are exposed to diseases carried by their stock. Exposure 
to dangerous pathogens in the workplace could lead to the development of 
infectious disease, disease caused by the toxins produced by the dangerous 
pathogen, or an allergic reaction.  
3.2 Legislation  
Dangerous pathogens include infectious agents that cause diseases 
transmissible between animals and man (zoonoses). Such agents are 
controlled under human health (DH/HPA remit), health and safety (HSE 
remit), and animal health legislation (Defra remit). The primary purpose of the 
latter legislation is to prevent the introduction and spread of animal diseases 
that affect farmed livestock and poultry.  
One of ACDP’s roles is to advise on worker health and safety, and much of its 
advice supports health and safety legislation on the control of exposure to 
hazardous substances such as dangerous pathogens. Health and safety 
legislation (principally the Control of Substances Hazardous to Health 
[CoSHH] Regulations 2002 (as amended)) requires employers to assess the 
risks from dangerous pathogens in their workplace and to prevent or control 
exposure. Further information can be obtained from the HSE website: 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/biosafety/index.htm  
Defra seeks to control imports of animal pathogens and carriers from third 
countries under the Importation of Animal Pathogens Order 1980, and animal 
pathogens causing serious, predominantly exotic, diseases of farmed 
livestock and poultry under the Specified Animal Pathogens Order 1998 by 
means of licensing regimes. Further information can be obtained from Defra’s 
website: http://www.defra.gov.uk/  
There are various pieces of legislation covering public health; further 
information on these can be obtained from the DH website: 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/Home/fs/en
3.3 Role of the ACDP  
The work of ACDP can be broadly divided into two areas:  
•  Production of guidance relating to safety at work and protection 
of public health;  
•  Provision of advice to Government on the formulation and 
implementation of policy and legislation, relating to specific 
pathogen risk issues and their impact  
 
ACDP makes a significant contribution to the assessment of risks to 
employees and the general public from infectious agents, and to ensuring that 
  4appropriate controls are in place. It has produced several guidance 
documents that give practical advice on the application of health and safety 
measures for a range of occupational groups and on a range of public health 
issues. These can be found at:  
http://www.advisorybodies.doh.gov.uk/acdp/publications.htm
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  54. MEMBERSHIP IN 2009  
4.1 Membership of the Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens 
(ACDP)  
 
Independent 
member  
Expert/Employer/ Employee 
representative/Lay Member  Employer  
Professor George  
Griffin (Chair) 
Expert in clinical and research 
microbiology and infectious 
diseases 
St George’s Hospital 
Medical School, 
Professor Colin 
Howard  
Expert in veterinary 
microbiology/parasitology 
The Royal Veterinary 
College  
Dr Judith Hilton  Expert in risk assessment and 
management  Food Standards Agency 
Professor Will Irving   Expert in clinical virology   University of 
Nottingham  
Ms Karen Jones   Lay Member   Air Support 
International, Crawley 
Dr John Keddie   Employer representative   GlaxoSmithKline  
Mr John McLuckie   Employee Representative   Belfast City Hospital  
Professor Dominic 
James Mellor 
Expert in veterinary 
microbiology, epidemiology 
and/or population medicine 
University of Glasgow 
Dr Phil Minor   Expert in research virology 
National Institute of 
Biological Standards 
and Control 
Mrs Judith Potter   Employee Representative   Royal Devon and Exeter 
NHS Foundation Trust 
Dr Andrew Rycroft   Expert in veterinary 
microbiology 
The Royal Veterinary 
College  
Professor Armine 
Sefton  Expert in medical microbiology  Bart’s and The London  
Mr Gordon Sutehall   Expert in laboratory health 
and safety  Addenbrooke’s Hospital 
Professor Richard 
Tedder  Expert in Clinical Virology  Health Protection 
Agency 
Dr Peter Wilson   Employer representative   St Andrew’s Hospital  
 
Assessors and observers  Representing 
Dr Bob Adak  Health Protection Agency 
Dr David Brown  Health Protection Agency, Centre for Infections 
Dr Ian Brown  Veterinary Laboratories Agency 
Professor Brian Duerden  Department of Health, Inspector of Microbiology 
Professor Don Jeffries  Chairman of the ACDP TSE Working Group 
Mrs Ruth Lysons  Department for Environment Food and Rural 
Affairs 
  6Mr John Newbold   Health and Safety Executive  
  
Dr Andrew Paterson  Department for Environment Food and Rural 
Affairs 
Dr Roland Salmon  National Public Health Service for Wales 
Ms Tracy Sartin  Cabinet Office 
Dr Delia Scan  Department of Health, Social Services and Public 
Safety, Northern Ireland 
Ms Maggie Tomlinson  Department of Health 
Dr Graeme Walker  Health and Safety Executive 
Dr Malcolm McWhirter  Scottish Executive 
  
Secretariat  Representing 
Miss Jessica Dean (from 
October 2009) 
Department for Environment Food and Rural 
Affairs 
Miss Amanda Furlonger 
(from October 2009) 
Department for Environment Food and Rural 
Affairs 
Miss Papia Khanom (until 
October 2009) 
Department for Environment Food and Rural 
Affairs 
Mr Graham Lott (until 
October 2009) 
Department for Environment Food and Rural 
Affairs 
Miss Charlotte Mirrielies  Health Protection Agency 
Dr Justine Robilliard (until 
October 2009) 
Department for Environment Food and Rural 
Affairs 
Ms Diane Tsavalos (until 
June 2009)  Health and Safety Executive 
Mr Lee Wilson (from 
October 2009)  Health and Safety Executive 
 
 
Three new Members joined the Committee in 2009, Dr Judith Hilton, from the 
Food Standards Agency (FSA), Professor, the Honourable Richard Tedder, 
from the Centre for Infections at the Health Protection Agency (HPA) and 
Professor Dominic Mellor of the Institute of Comparative Medicine at the 
University of Glasgow  
 
There were a number of changes to the Secretariat during 2009. Ms Amanda 
Furlonger and Dr Justine Robilliard and subsequently Miss Jessica Dean 
replaced Miss Papia Khanom and Mr Graham Lott as Defra Secretariat and 
Mr Lee Wilson replaced Ms Diane Tsavalos as HSE Secretariat. 
 
Miss Charlotte Mirrielies stepped down after three years as Department of 
Health Secretariat. Miss Mirrielies had formed an integral part of the 
Secretariat, and had made significant contributions to the work of the 
committee. 
  7 
4.2 Membership of the ACDP TSE Working Group 
 
Independent member  Employer 
Professor Don Jefferies 
(Chair) 
University of London 
Mr Ray Bradley  Private BSE Consultant 
Dr Adam Fraise  Queen Elizabeth Hospital, Birmingham 
Professor Colin Howard  Royal veterinary College 
Professor James Ironside  University of Edinburgh 
Professor Jean Manson  Neuropathogenesis Unit, Roslin Institute 
Dr Phil Minor  National Institute of Biological Standards and Control 
Dr Michael Painter  Public Health Consultant (retired) 
Dr Geoff Ridgway  Consultant Microbiologist (retired) 
Dr Roland Salmon  National Public Health Service for Wales 
Mr Ron Spellman  Unison 
Dr Tim Wyatt  Mater Hospital Trust, Northern Ireland 
  
Officials and Observers  Representing 
Mr Peter Bennett  Department of Health, Statistical Unit 
Mr Patrick Burke  Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs 
Dr Michael Rogers  Secretariat to the Advisory Committee on the Safety 
of Blood, Tissues and Organs 
Dr Andrew Riley  Scottish Executive 
Dr Nicky Connor  CJD Incidents Panel Secretariat 
Dr Darren Cutts  Food Standards Agency (retired mid-2007) 
Dr Irene Hill  Food Standards Agency 
Mr Allan Hidderley  Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory 
Agency 
Mr Mark Noterman  Department of Health, CJD Policy 
Mr David Pryer  Chair of CJD Incidents Panel 
Dr Peter Grimley  Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee 
Secretariat, Defra 
Mr Nigel Tomlinson  Department of Health, Estates and Facilities 
  
Secretariat  Representing 
Miss Charlotte Mirrielees/  
Miss Julia Granerod   Health Protection Agency 
 
There were some changes to the TSE Working Group in 2009. These were: 
 
•  Prof Ian McConnell left the TSE Working Group in December 2009 
•  Dr Adam Fraise joined the TSE Working Group in November 2009 
•  Miss Julia Granerod replaced Miss Charlotte Mirrielees as Scientific 
Secretariat in December 2009  
•  Mr Craig Kirby changed to a papers-only observer in 2009 
•  Dr Mike Paton and Mr John Pride (HSE observers) left the TSE 
Working Group in 2009 
•  Dr Elaine Gadd left the TSE Working Group in 2009. 
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4.3 Membership of the Containment Working Group 
 
Independent member  Employer 
Professor George Griffin 
(Chair) 
St George’s, University of London 
Professor Malcolm 
Bennett 
Liverpool University 
Dr David Brown  Health Protection Agency 
Dr Gary Burns  Astra Zeneca 
Dr Tim Doel  Merial Animal Health 
Dr Trevor Drew  Veterinary Laboratory Agency 
Dr Uwe Mueller-Doblies  Institute for Animal Health 
Dr Michael Skinner  Imperial College, London 
Mr Gordon Sutehall  Health Protection Agency 
  
Secretariat  Representing 
Ms Julia Crouch  Health and Safety Executive 
Mrs Ruth Lysons  Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs 
Ms Lorraine Medcalf  Health and Safety executive 
Miss Charlotte Mirrielies  Health Protection Agency 
Mr John Newbold  Health and Safety Executive 
Ms Maggie Tomlinson  Health Protection Agency 
  
 
 
 
4.4 Membership of the Drafting Group for Revision of the ACDP 
guidance on blood-borne viruses 
 
Independent member  Employer 
Professor Will Irving 
(Chair) 
University of Nottingham 
Dr Alan Beswick  Health and Safety Laboratory 
. . 
Mr Jonathon Gawn  Health and Safety Executive 
Mr John Newbold  Health and Safety Executive 
Dr Michael Painter  Public Health Physician (retired) 
. . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  95. Key issues discussed by ACDP in 2009 
 
In 2009 the ACDP held three main meetings: the 91
st on the 10
th 
February, the 
92nd
 
on the 8-9
th 
June and the 93
rd on the 10
th 
October. 
 
Members discussed the progress of ACDP Working Groups under the 
Secretariat Report at each meeting. ACDP Working Group reports for 2009 
are in section 6 of this document. 
 
 
5.1    91
st Meeting – 10
th February 2009. 
 
At the 91
st meeting, members discussed: 
 
Revision of the ACDP guidance on blood-borne viruses (BBV) 
 
A considerable number of comments on the draft guidance were received 
from a very constructive public consultation, which was held in 2008, closing 
in November. It was hoped that the final draft would be available for sign off 
by the committee at this meeting, however, there were some outstanding 
issues to take into consideration and instead, the final draft of the guidance 
will be presented at a later meeting. 
 
Working group to draft guidance on non-circulating strains of influenza virus  
 
The committee agreed to form a small working group to update the current 
ACDP document “Advice on working with influenza viruses”, available here: 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/biosafety/diseases/acdpflu.pdf.    The Working Group 
would include at least one member with experience of animal viruses, a 
member of the Scientific Advisory Committee on Genetic Modification to cover 
GM issues and a virologist from the National Institute for Biological Standards 
and Control (NIBSC). 
 
Q fever vaccination – feedback from the Joint Committee on Vaccination and 
Immunisation (JCVI)
 
JCVI discussed immunisation of humans against Q fever at its meeting in 
October 2008. The Chairman of JCVI provided ACDP with the background 
paper prepared for the Committee for this item, and a letter to the ACDP 
Chairman detailing the outcome of their discussions.  The background paper 
outlined the effective vaccines available against the Q fever organism, 
Coxiella burnetii, and the current strategy in Australia for use of the whole cell 
vaccine Q-vax. 
 
JCVI were asked to consider two possibilities for vaccination in the UK – for 
use in an outbreak situation, and as an occupational control measure. The 
Committee did not feel that vaccination was likely to be of benefit in the 
outbreak situation and that more detail was needed on the burden of the 
disease in occupational at risk groups. JCVI would be considering this again 
  10at their June meeting, once they have received data from the HPA on the 
burden of disease. Their final decision will be reported back to ACDP following 
this meeting. 
 
Poliovirus facilities containment plan 
 
The W HO Poliovirus eradication programme requires all potential sources of 
wild poliovirus, including laboratory sources, to be destroyed or safely 
contained.  As a result the JCVI and ACDP set up a joint Working Party to 
take this work forward in the UK in 2000.  The Working Party meets at least 
once a year to review progress.   
 
In 2008, the Department of Health commissioned work to review activities in 
the UK against the WHO global action plan for laboratory containment of wild 
polioviruses and to make recommendations on future action required.  This 
report has now been completed and was presented to members.  HSE are 
conducting an audit of laboratories in the UK, which have stocks of wild 
polioviruses, and this is expected to be completed by the end of March 2009. 
A report on the findings will be prepared.   
 
Publication of the Griffin Review 
 
An Independent Review of the Highest Level Microbiological Containment 
Facilities in the UK, led by Professor George Griffin, reported in October 2008.  
 
 
5.2    92
nd  Meeting – 8
/9
th June 2009. 
 
At the 92
nd meeting Members discussed: 
 
Additional guidance on Neisseria meningitidis  
 
ACDP approved the additional guidance produced by HSE for laboratory 
workers working with Neisseria meningitidis, which was included in the 
Secretariat report. The guidance will be published on the ACDP website.  
 
 
West Nile virus - draft proposal for serology study  
 
A virologist from the Virus Reference Department at the HPA Centre for 
Infections, seconded from the European Centre for Disease Control, has been 
identified to draft a proposal for a wider serology study. Progress on this work 
will be presented at a future ACDP meeting.  
 
 
Seasonal influenza vaccination of poultry workers  
 
The current findings from the 2008/2009 seasonal influenza immunisation 
programme for poultry workers in England which ran from 1 September 2008 
to 31 March 2009 were presented to members.  The uptake rate for 2008/9 
  11was reported to be 14.5%. Although this  is viewed as disappointingly low, it 
does represent an increase of 1.5% from the previous year.  
 
The uptake rate was based on a response from 135 out of 152 Primary Care 
Trusts (PCTs) who identified 28,202 poultry workers. It was also noted that 
the uptake varied considerably by Region, and was similar to the uptake rate 
for seasonal influenza vaccination of Healthcare workers, which is usually 
around 17%.  
 
In Northern Ireland, the total number of poultry workers vaccinated for 
seasonal flu during 2008/09 was reported to be 173.  It was reported that 
there had been a lot of difficulty in Northern Ireland in calculating a 
denominator i.e. the total number of poultry workers eligible for vaccination, 
and thus it was difficult to interpret the uptake figures with respect to the 
eligible population.  
 
Update on SAPO classification of Highly Pathogenic Porcine Reproductive 
and Respiratory Syndrome Virus (HP_PRRS)  
 
Defra updated the committee on progress to classify the Highly Pathogenic 
Porcine Reproductive and Respiratory Syndrome virus (HP-PRRS), which is 
not currently classified under SAPO. At the last ACDP meeting, Members had 
been unable to formally classify the virus and requested additional scientific 
information which Defra agreed to provide.  The additional information 
comprises; 
 
•  Creation of a disease profile to allow for easier comparison to 
other agents. This profile is in the final stages of validation. 
•  Production of an impact assessment to examine the impact of 
an incursion of HP-PRRS on the UK pig population. 
•  Creation of a side-by-side comparison of HP-PRRS to other 
porcine pathogens (Aujeszky’s Disease, Classical Swine Fever 
and African Swine Fever) currently categorised under SAPO  
 
 
 
Working Group to write Guidance on non-circulating strains of human 
influenza virus of known pandemic potential  
 
The Secretariat reported that despite a number of attempts to organise a 
meeting in the first half of 2009 there had been no convenient date for all 
members. It was therefore proposed that, following discussions at this 
meeting, HSE and the Secretariat would draft an update to the Guidance and 
circulate it to the proposed Working Group members for comment.  
 
Risk to public health from non H5/7 Avian Influenza subtypes ACDP/92/P10  
 
There had been two outbreaks of low pathogenicity H6 avian influenza in 
turkey premises in February 2009 in the east of England. The HPA's protocol 
  12for responding to outbreaks of avian influenza from low pathogenicity non 
H5/H7 serotypes was followed in managing the public health risks. There had 
been discussion at the time of the outbreak as to whether any additional 
precautions were needed, given that H6 strains of influenza were amongst 
those considered by WHO to be of pandemic potential, on the basis of 
research results. However, in view of the risk assessment done, it was 
determined that no additional measures were needed to those already 
implemented to protect public health.  
 
Members also considered the need to review the HPA protocol in relation to 
such non H5/H7 low pathogenic strains in the light of the inclusion of H6 
strains on the WHO list of strains with pandemic potential. It was agreed  that 
there was no need to change the current HPA protocol for responding to 
outbreaks of avian influenza. 
 
 
ACDP 2008 annual report 
 
The Secretariat presented the ACDP annual report 2008 which had been 
drafted to include membership of the committee and all Working Groups, and 
a summary of key issues discussed throughout the year. Members approved 
the document and the report was published on the ACDP website hosted by 
HSE.  
 
5.3  93rd Meeting – 13
th October 2009 
 
At the 93rd meeting Members discussed: 
 
 
Advice on working with A/H1N1 pandemic influenza virus  
As a result of the confirmation in August 2009 that novel A/H1N1 pandemic 
influenza virus was widely circulating in the UK, with sustained levels of 
transmission, HSE published a statement on their website confirming that all 
laboratory based work with the virus, including handling, concentration and 
propagation, could take place at Containment Level 2, subject to a suitable 
and sufficient risk assessment, with use of an Microbiological Safety Cabinet 
(MSC) until inactivation of the virus.  
 
 
 
A/H1N1 pandemic influenza virus in pigs in Northern Ireland  
A/H1N1 pandemic influenza in pigs – Worker protection 
 
Defra reported that the circulating A/H1N1 pandemic influenza virus 
circulating in the human population was confirmed as having been found in 
three pig herds in Northern Ireland during September and October. These are 
the first confirmed reports in pigs in the UK; worldwide, a number of pig herds 
have also been infected. It was considered that due to the current human flu 
  13pandemic, these findings were not unexpected, and would not pose any 
increased risk to the general public. Defra and the devolved administrations 
are collaborating closely with the pig industry to develop of a Code of Practice 
for pig keepers to reduce the risk of infection in pig herds, and minimise 
spread should a herd become infected.  
 
Members also considered the need for additional advice to pig workers. 
Current guidance on zoonotic risk protection is available from the HSE 
website  however inn view of the current situation it was agreed that more 
specific advice may be required.  Defra and HSE agreed to set up a meeting 
with representatives of the pig industry to consider protective measures for pig 
workers and report back the findings to ACDP. 
 
Vaccination of pig workers was discussed by members taking into account the 
recent change in circulation of A/H1N1. With the wide  circulation in the 
human population, and with sustained levels of transmission, it was concluded 
that pig workers were at greater risk of infection from contact in the community 
than contact with pigs at work. Vaccination was not therefore proposed at this 
time, particularly as those at risk from flu would be captured as part of the risk 
groups in the community for both A/H1N1 and seasonal flu vaccine.  
 
 
 
Update on SAPO classification of Highly Pathogenic Porcine Reproductive 
and Respiratory Syndrome Virus (HP-PRRSv) 
Defra reported an ongoing consultation exercise to consider adding Porcine 
Reproductive and Respiratory Syndrome virus Genotype 2 (PRRSv2) as a 
Category 3 organism to SAPO 2008 by means of an Amendment Order. Defra 
informed Members that they were not aware of anyone currently wishing to 
work with this virus in the UK, and asked members to bring the consultation to 
the attention of relevant colleagues.  
 
 
Needlestick injuries and the use of safe devices  
 
Members discussed the use of ‘safe devices’ to prevent needlestick injuries in 
Healthcare, HSE agreed to consider how the application of CoSHH, in 
particular the hierarchy of control and risk assessment would affect the use of 
such systems within the healthcare sector.. It was agreed that the secretariat 
would report back at the next meeting.  
 
Members were also informed that the use of “safe devices” had also been 
discussed at the Advisory Group on Hepatitis, and it had been reported at that 
meeting that there are inconsistencies with how safe devices are used in the 
NHS.  
 
Polio  
 
  14A full update regarding the national inventory and audit of laboratories holding 
poliovirus was included in the Secretariat Report. The HSE final report will be 
placed before the UK Working Group meeting in November for consideration. 
It was reported that 48 laboratories in the UK are still holding polio or 
materials, which may contain the virus. Each of these laboratories would be 
visited as part of the audit programme and where possible encouraged to 
dispose of their virus stocks or material. 
 
Positive Pressure Ventilation Lobby (PPVL) isolation room design  
 
The research findings on the performance of 'Positive Pressure Ventilated 
Lobby' patient isolation facilities had been sent out for a second expert peer 
review exercise. The initial exercise did not provide sufficient opinions on the 
aerodynamic analysis undertaken. Information on the subsequent analysis is 
to be presented to Members at a future meeting.  
 
 
ACDP review 2010  
 
The Secretariat informed Members that a ‘light touch’ review of ACDP, its 
Working Groups and subgroups will be reviewed in 2010.  
 
 
Progress update on the Single Regulatory Framework for animal and human 
pathogens  
 
An update on the development of the single regulatory framework for animal 
and human pathogens was provided to members. Details of individual work 
streams within the project and their progress were included in detail.  A 
number of focus groups involving key stakeholders are planned for the 
autumn of 2009 to help disseminate information to laboratory sectors, review 
emerging issues and provide feedback to the HSE project team. A legislative 
reform order (LRO) is required to amend the Health & safety at Work etc Act 
1974 to provide HSE with the vires to regulate contained use aspects of 
animal health. A public consultation on the LRO is planned to run from 
January to mid-April 2010. 
  
HSE introduced the final draft of the ACDP Biosafety Guidance, which had 
been drafted by HSE and the ACDP Containment Working Group.  This new 
guidance will support the single regulatory framework and become the first 
ACDP publication available to dutyholders who wish to work with human or 
animal pathogens under the new regulations. The guidance will provide 
practical advice on risk assessment and selection of containment measures 
for working with human and animal pathogens in contained use settings. . 
This guidance will be included within the public consultation package, together 
with the new regulations, is planned for early 2010 and will run for 3 months.   
 
HSE are currently developing the new ‘Approved List 2011’, which will brigade 
together human and animal pathogens from current (ACDP 2004 and SAPO 
2008) lists into one document using the newly defined combined hazard 
  15groups.  The categorisation of biological agents in this document will be an 
Approved List made under Section 15 of the Health and Safety at Work etc 
Act 1974.  The CU2011 Regulations, by referring to this list, imposes 
requirements, which are legally binding.  The list will be formally reviewed by 
ACDP at a meeting later in the year 
 
 
Revision of ACDP guidance following the implementation of the new 
Contained Use Regulations 2010  
 
Members considered the consequences of the new single regulatory 
framework on existing ACDP guidance. The removal of schedule 3 of COSHH 
and replacement with a new set of regulations specifically aimed at contained 
use would, render a considerable amount of existing occupationally related 
ACDP guidance outdated.  
Members were asked to consider which of the existing guidance was likely to 
need revision and to identify which were no longer needed.  
 
 
 
6.  ACDP WORKING GROUPS 
 
6.1  Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Working Group (TSE 
WG) 
 
The TSE WG was reconfigured in 2004 with the following terms of reference: 
“To provide practical, scientifically based advice on the management of 
risks from transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), in order 
to limit or reduce the risks of human exposure to or transmission of 
TSEs in healthcare and other occupational settings.  To provide advice 
to ACDP, SEAC and Government Departments, as requested, and to 
handle issues referred to those bodies, taking into account the work of 
other relevant bodies.”   
The TSE WG met twice in 2009 on the 12
th March and 17
th September. 
 
At each meeting, members received an update on the numbers and 
epidemiology of both CJD and BSE cases and a progress report on current 
research. Members also received feedback from the ACDP, and related 
committees such as the CJD Incidents Panel, the Spongiform Encephalopathy 
Advisory Committee, the Advisory Committee on the Safety of Blood, Tissues 
and Organs and the Engineering and Science Advisory Committee on the 
decontamination of surgical instruments, including prion removal. 
 
The following key issues were considered by the TSE Working Group in 2009: 
 
Assessment to be carried out before surgery and/or endoscopy to identify 
patients with, or at risk of, CJD or vCJD (Annex J) 
  16Revisions to Annex J were discussed at both the March and September 
meetings of the TSE Working Group. These revisions included: 
1) The addition of a new question to identify those who have received 
transfusions from 80 or more donors;  
2) Possible revision of the recommendation that those who received 
human-derived dura mater between 1980 and August 1992 are at 
increased risk of vCJD. 
[It has since been decided that those who received human-derived dura mater 
between 1980 and August 1992 are no longer at increased risk of vCJD. This 
decision was based on there having been no cases of iatrogenic CJD, 
associated with dura   
mater grafting, which could be identified as due to the variant form, and also 
information provided by the manufacturers about the countries of origin of the 
clinical  
material. 
Annex J has since been updated at: 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/ab/ACDP/TSEguidance/index.htm] 
 
Ophthalmology (Annex L) 
 
An Ophthalmology subgroup was convened in November 2007 to provide 
practical guidance on risk reduction and management of CJD transmission 
with respect to ophthalmic practice.  
 
The resulting guidance was submitted to the ACDP TSE Working Group for 
ratification. A number of issues regarding the ophthalmology guidance were 
discussed and resolved at the March meeting of the TSE Working Group. 
These included: 
 
Clarification of anterior versus posterior surgery 
Scleral buckling surgery 
Ocular tissue transplantation 
Allogeneic sclera 
Decontamination protocol for diagnostic equipment in eye units 
 
The guidance was published in September 2009 at: 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/ab/ACDP/TSEguidance/index.htm
 
Part 4 
At the September meeting of the TSE Working Group it was agreed that the 
Part 4 of the Working Group guidance on infection control of CJD and related 
disorders in the healthcare setting was in need of revision in several areas. 
The input of Members was required specifically on the following issues: 
Low risk procedures on symptomatic CJD/vCJD patients 
Surface decontamination 
  17Clinical waste disposal 
Use of surgical instruments exclusively on the same patient and Annex E 
 
[Part 4 has since been published at: 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/ab/ACDP/TSEguidance/index.htm] 
 
Decontamination and waste disposal (Annex C) 
 
To move forward with the proposed update to Annex C of the Working Group 
guidance it was agreed that, instead of updating Annex C as it currently 
stands, much of the information would be moved into Parts 3 and 4 of the 
guidance which contain advice on working with TSEs in laboratory and 
healthcare environments. It was agreed that Annex C would be reduced to a 
more technical document, for example outlining the effective/ineffective 
chemicals and processes for decontamination, and the relevant legislation 
and guidance. 
 
Annex C was published in November 2009 at: 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/ab/ACDP/TSEguidance/index.htm
Article on the Working Group guidance in the Bulletin of the Royal College of 
Pathologists  
To raise the profile of its guidance with the members of the Royal College of 
Pathologists, the Working Group wrote a one page article in the Bulletin of the 
Royal College of Pathologists. The article was published in the July 2009 
issue. 
  
Urology alert 
 
Most transrectal prostatic biopsies are undertaken by means of single use 
needle devices guided by an adjacent ultrasound probe. However, some 
transrectal prostatic biopsies are undertaken by means of single use needles 
passed through the internal lumens of reusable ultrasound probes. There is 
therefore a potential risk of vCJD cross-infection occurring during prostatic 
biopsy if this type of reusable equipment is employed for this procedure on 
patients at risk of vCJD, because there is no decontamination method that 
reliably eliminates or destroys abnormal prion protein. 
An alert was produced for urological surgeons raising this issue for patients 
who are at increased risk of vCJD and outlining various management options 
if the equipment to do a transrectal prostatic biopsy by means of a single use 
needle guided by an adjacent ultrasound probe is not available. This alert was 
approved by the Working Group and was subsequently issued by the MHRA. 
 
House of Lords Science and Technology Committee on "Setting funding 
priorities for scientific and technological research" 
 
  18The House of Lords Science and Technology Committee undertook an inquiry 
into the setting of research funding priorities within Government and other 
bodies responsible for the allocation of public funds for science and 
technology research and had invited evidence for this inquiry. The Working 
Group considered the opportunity this presented to raise some issues facing 
the TSE research community, particularly the declining funding for TSE 
research and the number of important unanswered questions that remain 
about these diseases. Thus, a joint response was drafted and submitted from 
the Working Group, SEAC, the CJD Incidents Panel and ESAC-Pr. 
 
Annex H 
 
In April 2009 the Association of Anatomical Pathology Technologists (AAPT) 
wrote to the Working Group with regards to Annex H (After death). Both the 
letter and the revised Annex H document contained detailed comments on the 
Annex, and suggestions for new wording and a new approach. The Working 
Group considered the response from the AAPT on Annex H of the guidance 
and welcomed many of the comments made.  
 
[Annex H has since been revised to incorporate comments from the AAPT 
and is due to be published shortly.] 
 
 
6.2  Containment Working Group 
 
As part of the development and implementation of the single regulatory 
framework, the Callaghan Review recommended the development of clear 
technical guidance covering contained use of both wild-type human and 
animal pathogens and GMMs, incorporating a common set of containment 
measures aimed at ensuring adequate control of those pathogens.   .The 
purpose of the working group was to produce clear technical guidance, which 
defines: 
 
•  New combined hazard groups for all pathogens within scope 
•  A common set of containment measures covering laboratory, animal 
work, GM plants and e.g. large scale 
•  Risk based approach to selection of appropriate control measures for 
safely containing risks from work with human & animal pathogens. 
•  Appropriate use of derogation within legal requirements to support a risk 
based approach 
•  Provide flexibility in selection of laboratory control measures for all 
pathogens 
• Activity  classification 
• Notification  requirements 
 
The working group met five times during the year, January, March, May July 
and October and made considerable progress in drafting the new biosafety 
guidelines and Approved list. The draft has been seen by both the main 
  19committees of ACDP and SACGM and will form part of the public consultation 
package for the new regulations.  
 
 
 
6.3  Drafting Group for revision of the ACDP guidance on blood-borne 
viruses 
 
A considerable number of comments on the draft guidance were received 
from a very constructive consultation, which had been held in 2008, closing in 
November. An amended draft was presented to the committee at the 92
nd 
meeting and Members were informed of the changes that had been made to 
the document, particularly in relation to occupational health.  Subject to legal 
clarifications on Part 2 and final editing of the guidance text, the final 
document would go forward for publication in mid 2010. 
 
Secretariat 
February 2011 
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